WAR RESPONSIBILITY--delving into the past (3) / Matsuoka, Oshima misled diplomacy

The Yomiuri Shimbun

Some conservatives claim that the war against the United States was a "war of self-defense" for Japan. They base their arguments on the United States' oil embargo and the Hull note of Nov. 26, 1941, which was considered a de facto ultimatum delivered to Japan by U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull shortly before the start of the war. However, the U.S. pressure on Japan to suspend its military advance in China came about, to a large extent, by Japan's "misjudgment." Japan in a sense drove itself over the precipice. So, who made the misjudgment and why?

First of all, the most critical mistake was the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty with Germany and Italy in September 1940. Then Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, an enthusiastic proponent of the pact, originally planned to demand that the United States give concessions by forming a four-nation entente by adding the Soviet Union to the tripartite pact countries.

However, the Tripartite Alliance was nothing but a military alliance against the United States. The United States, which by then had imposed economic sanctions against Japan, had further hardened its attitude toward Japan. Furthermore, around the time the treaty was concluded, Germany abandoned its plan to invade the British homeland and was steeling itself for war with the Soviet Union.

Hiroshi Oshima, then ambassador to Germany, continually sent misleading information to Japan, blindly believing Germany would win the war against the Soviet Union.

When Matsuoka's plan to win U.S. concessions collapsed due to the outbreak of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, Japan could have chosen to abolish the Tripartite Treaty and improve relations with the United States.

However, Oshima kept on sending information depicting the war situation as being favorable for Germany. For instance, "The war will end in four weeks [with victory for Germany]," he said immediately after German-Soviet hostilities started.

Toshio Shiratori, then ambassador to Italy, proposed "innovative diplomacy." He lacked the ability to make levelheaded judgments on international situations due to his pro-German, anti-U.S. attitude. Consequently, he gave the government flawed diplomatic advice.

The navy, because of fears of a possible war with the United States, resisted the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance. However, Koshiro Oikawa, who was the navy minister, finally changed his mind and supported the treaty.

The army had been promoting the alliance plan since the first cabinet of Fumimaro Konoe and the cabinet of Kiichiro Hiranuma. To successfully overthrow the cabinet of Mitsumasa Yonai, who was cautious about the treaty, the army had then War Minister Shunroku Hata submit a letter of resignation. The army abused the system of appointing active-duty military officers to military ministers' posts. Actively moving behind the scenes was Akira Muto, director of the Military Affairs Bureau at the War Ministry, among others.

The mistake comparable with the Tripartite Alliance was the advance into southern French Indochina in July 1941. The United States, which was wary about Japan's southward push, repeatedly warned Japan. Immediately before Japan's advance into southern French Indochina, Japanese Ambassador to the United States Kichisaburo Nomura was sending telegram messages on the possibility of an oil embargo.

The navy led the advancement into French Indochina. Naval General Staff Chief Adm. Osami Nagano strongly advocated advancing into southern French Indochina. To take control of oil resources in Dutch East India militarily, it was necessary to capture British Malaya, where British bases were located. And for that purpose, building a base in southern French Indochina was imperative. That was Nagano's plan.

However, it was quite evident that a war against Britain would develop into a war against the United States because the United States was about to enter the European theater.

Nagano's judgment was grossly affected by midcareer naval staff who were mostly pro-Germany and anti-American.

"Even against the United States, we will be invincible," said Shingo Ishikawa, chief of the Second Section of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry. He was considered a leader of such officers. Ishikawa drafted a written opinion to urge Nagano and others to resolutely advance into southern French Indochina.

Ishikawa also erred in his assessment of the national strength of the United States. He underevaluated the United States in material national strength, an important factor for judging whether Japan could go to war with the United States, including the wear amount of vessels.

The Tripartite Alliance was led by Matsuoka and others, while advancement to and stationing in southern French Indochina was mainly led by Nagano and others. Nevertheless, it was Fumimaro Konoe, then prime minister, who made the final decisions to implement these strategies as national policies and led this country to war against the United States.

Those mainly responsible

-- Fumimaro Konoe, prime minister

-- Yosuke Matsuoka, foreign minister

-- Hiroshi Oshima, ambassador to Germany

-- Toshio Shiratori, ambassador to Italy

-- Osami Nagano, chief of Naval General Staff

-- Shingo Ishikawa, chief of 2nd section of the Navy Ministry's Naval Affairs Bureau