WAR RESPONSIBILITY--delving into the past (5) / Tojo, Koiso ignore defeats

The Yomiuri Shimbun

The Japanese forces continued poorly thought-out operations in the war with the United States. Why did Japan overlook crucial turning points of war situations?

The first major turning point was the Battle of Midway in June 1942. In the battle, Japan lost four major aircraft carriers and much of its air power, resulting in the loss of both air and naval supremacy in the Pacific Ocean in one sweep.

Top navy officials including Shigeru Fukutome, chief of the Operation Department of the Naval General Staff, were unable to foresee the deployment of enemy aircraft carriers. Proud of the victory in the attack on Pearl Harbor, the navy obviously underestimated the strength of the U.S. forces.

Furthermore, Japan began an operation to regain Guadalcanal Island (August 1942--February 1943) but wrongly predicted when a major U.S. counteroffensive would likely be launched.

Hajime Sugiyama, chief of the Army General Staff, made the mistake of sending troops in several small deployments. Shinichi Tanaka, chief of operations at the Army General Staff, yelled at Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, "You idiot!" when Tojo rejected his request for more vessels to be sent to ensure the operation's success.

Deprived of air and naval superiority in the Pacific, Japan had tremendous difficulty providing supplies such as food, weapons and ammunition through sea transportation. It was becoming obvious that Japan could not continue the war against the United States.

As he distrusted the supreme command, Tojo decided to concurrently serve as chief of Army General Staff in February 1944, breaking the longstanding rule of the army. Tojo also appointed Naval Minister Shigetaro Shimada to chief of the Naval General Staff.

In July 1944, Saipan and other Mariana Islands were taken over by the enemy, puncturing the "Absolute National Defense Zone" of Japan--areas deemed indispensable for Japan's mainland defense and continuation of the war. The government had ordered that these areas should be defended at all cost.

The news of these defeats greatly shocked the public. The war guidance unit of the War Ministry at the Imperial General Headquarters (Daihonei) concluded: "The empire has no prospect of regaining its previous strength and it will likely decline gradually. Thus, we should seek an end to the war immediately."

Finally, the momentum to oust the Tojo government became irresistible and the cabinet resigned en masse later that month.

Three years before, when asked by the Emperor about the prospects in the event of war against the United States, Sugiyama, then serving as the chief of the Army General Staff, replied that Japan would "end the war" in about three months.

Such a questionable opinion was not held by Sugiyama alone. Kenryo Sato, chief of Military Affairs Bureau at the War Ministry, Osami Nagano, chief of the Naval General Staff, and Takazumi Oka, chief of the Navy Ministry's Military Affairs Bureau, who all had supported the Tojo regime, favored "carrying on with the war," even after the Japanese forces had lost all prospect of turning the tide and winning the war.

If the successor to the Tojo Cabinet had embraced the view of the war guidance unit, it would have been a prime opportunity to end the war.

However, Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso failed to initiate earnest discussions aimed at ending the war.

Koiso believed that Japan needed to win a battle against the United States in the Philippines to gain leverage in any peace negotiations. Koiso decided to carry out operations to counter U.S. advances toward Japan and to engage them in battles on Japanese soil later.

Koiso established the Supreme War Council of war leaders. Its Aug. 19, 1944, meeting was attended by Yoshijiro Umezu, chief of the Army General Staff; former War Minister Hajime Sugiyama; and Koshiro Oikawa, chief of the Naval General Staff, among others. The participants, undaunted by the deteriorating situation, said, "We should continue to prosecute the war" and "We should overcome the important situation."

In October 1944, the Japanese forces were decimated in ground and naval battles on the Philippines' Leyte Island, losing the bulk of their remaining air and naval capabilities.

In January 1945, the Army and Navy departments of the Imperial Headquarters decided to prepare for final battles on Okinawa and the mainland. At this point, Japan spurned a chance to avert the tragedy of Iwojima island, where 28,000 died, and the Battle of Okinawa, where 188,000 Japanese lost their lives.

Those mainly responsible

-- Hideki Tojo, prime minister, war minister

-- Kuniaki Koiso, prime minister

-- Osami Nagano, chief of the Naval General Staff

-- Hajime Sugiyama, chief of the Army General Staff

-- Shigetaro Shimada, navy minister

-- Kenryo Sato, chief of the War Ministry's Military Affairs Bureau

-- Takazumi Oka, chief of the Navy Ministry's Military Affairs Bureau

-- Shigeru Fukutome, chief of operations at the Naval General Staff