WAR RESPONSIBILITY--delving into the past (8) / Togo mistakenly seeks Soviet Union's help to resolve situation

The Yomiuri Shimbun

"The most important issue for the nation's future is whether the Japanese people, who are brave in times of war, can also demonstrate sagacity in diplomacy to the same degree as their courage in war," noted diplomatic analyst Kiyoshi Kiyosawa (1890-1945) in his book "Nihon Gaiko-shi" (History of Japan's Diplomacy, Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1942), after the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, on the assumption that it would lead to all-out hostilities.

However, no national leaders demonstrated both boldness and intelligence in diplomacy during the war.

Shigenori Togo, foreign minister in the cabinet of Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki, inaugurated on April 7, 1945, was resolved to bring an early end to the war since he had been foreign minister when the war against the United States started.

However, he made the extremely foolish decision to ask the Soviet Union, Japan's potential adversary, to act as a peace mediator between the two countries.

Of course, Togo did not know the Soviet Union had secretly agreed with the United States and Britain at the Yalta Conference in February of the same year to join the war against Japan.

On April 5, shortly before the inauguration of the Suzuki Cabinet, the Soviet Union notified Japan that it would not extend the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, which was scheduled to expire in April the following year. War Minister Korechika Anami and Army General Staff Chief Yoshijiro Umezu were determined to land at least one blow to the United States--meaning any victory in a certain battlefield--to bring the country to sit at a peace negotiation table. This concept was called "Ichigeki Kowa."

However, they thought that Soviet participation in the war would highly likely result in Japan's defeat in battles with the United States on the homeland. Umezu and others asked Togo to prevent the Soviet participation through diplomatic efforts.

"It's too late now," replied Togo, who was once ambassador to the Soviet Union. However, Togo thought it might not be a total waste of time to seek Soviet mediation. Utilizing the military's request as a good excuse, he presumed he could take some time in the negotiations.

Togo's decision is understandable, given that there was no other choice at that moment.

However, he was to blame for wasting too much precious time trying in vain to persuade the Soviet Union to stay out of the war.

Togo gambled on the negotiations between former Prime Minister Koki Hirota and Soviet Ambassador to Japan Iakov Malik, which started on June 3. However, the negotiations basically went nowhere from the beginning and achieved nothing before the talks were suspended on July 14.

After the war, Ambassador to the Soviet Union Naotake Sato said it was intolerable that "one precious month was wasted" as the nation's fate hung in the balance.

Japan waited too long for the Soviet Union's reply to its request for mediation. Moscow never answered the request, and as a result, Japan delayed accepting the Potsdam Declaration, announced on July 26, and could not prevent the devastating outcome: the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Soviet Union's participation in the war against Japan.

Suzuki's leadership as prime minister must be questioned. Of the six leaders at the Supreme War Council, three members--Togo, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai and Prime Minister Suzuki--wanted an early end to the war. However, Suzuki never expressed his position on the matter.

On Aug. 1, when Japan's empire was on the verge of capitulating, Togo asked Yonai to ask Suzuki what was on his mind.

At a meeting of the Supreme War Council on June 6, details of the status of national power were distributed to each of the members, who were informed of the harsh reality that Japan had already lost its capability to continue the war.

However, the council adopted the "general guideline on war direction," which stipulated that the nation was capable of continuing the war if measures were taken to galvanize the public's spirit. Nobody opposed this idea at another meeting of the council in the presence of the Emperor on June 8.

At the meeting attended by the Emperor, Naval General Staff Chief Soemu Toyoda fabricated and reported false estimations of casualties and damage that would be inflicted on the enemy forces during an expected invasion of the homeland. These figures suited the objectives of those who wanted the war to continue.

Anami made almost no comments in these meetings. It was likely that he was somewhat leaning toward early peace but he did not take any concrete actions.

Suzuki also made a telling mistake in handling the Potsdam Declaration. At a cabinet meeting, Umezu and Toyoda opposed Togo's proposal not to reject the declaration but to postpone a formal response to it at least until they received a reply from the Soviet Union to Japan's mediation request. In the end, the government decided to make no response to the declaration.

However, Suzuki, pressured by Naval General Staff Vice Chief Takijiro Onishi and others, said at a press conference that the government would "only ignore" (as reported by the Western media) the Potsdam Declaration, although he had actually intended to say "make no comment on" the declaration. His statement gave a pretext for the United States to drop the atomic bombs and for the Soviet Union to join the war against Japan.

Suzuki conspired with Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Koichi Kido in asking for the Emperor to hand down a decision on how to handle the declaration, even though the cabinet had not made a decision on the matter. After asking the Emperor twice to make "divine judgments," the Showa War finally came to an end.

Those mainly responsible

-- Yoshijiro Umezu, chief of the Army General Staff

-- Soemu Toyoda, chief of the Naval General Staff

-- Korechika Anami, war minister

-- Kantaro Suzuki, prime minister

-- Shigenori Togo, foreign minister