WAR RESPONSIBILITY--delving into the past (9) / Main blame lies with Tojo

The Yomiuri Shimbun

The Showa War was launched and terminated by leaders who lost their grip on international reality and veered from responsible politics.

Of them, we believe the person most responsible for the Showa War was Prime Minister Hideki Tojo. Likewise, more than 10 political and military leaders, including Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, should be held heavily responsible for erring in the conduct of state affairs. In addition, elite military officers and high-ranking bureaucrats who supported these leaders cannot shirk their responsibility.

Learning about Japan's grave mistakes can lead to consoling the victims of the war--even if just slightly--and also to fulfilling this generation's responsibility to our future generations.

What positions and roles did Hideki Tojo assume in the Showa War, which included the Manchurian Incident, the Sino-Japanese War and the Japan-U.S. War?

Utmost blame must be placed on Tojo when we look at war responsibilities from two aspects: responsibility for launching the war, and for continuing the fighting when defeat was inescapable. The first aspect refers to the escalation from the Sino-Japanese War to the war with Britain and the United States. The latter stemmed from the decision to initiate hostilities with the United States while knowing that Japan stood little chance of prevailing and the failure to employ effective measures to bring the war to an early end.

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Role of combat commander

Tojo's involvement in the Showa War began in March 1928, the third year of the Showa era.

At the time, he was a senior staff member--a post equivalent to that of acting section chief in today's government hierarchy--of the Army Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry.

During a meeting of the Mokuyo-kai (Thursday Society) that grouped reformist bureaucrats of the military, Tojo declared, "We will establish an absolute political force in the Manchuria-Inner Mongolia area."

Mokuyo-kai members included military elites who formulated and determined national policies in the War Ministry and the Army General Staff. Tojo, along with Tetsuzan Nagata and Yasuji Okamura who had been Tojo's senior by one year at the Army Military Academy, aimed to topple elements from what was the Choshu clan (now Yamaguchi Prefecture), who had dominated the mainstay of the military since the Meiji Restoration. They also wanted to prepare the entire nation for an all-out war and establish the prerogative of supreme command.

As the aftermath of World War I showed the necessity of national mobilization for an all-out war, Mokuyo-kai members believed Japan would have to secure Manchuria to effect national mobilization.

For them, the 1928 assassination of Chang Tso-lin (Zhang Zuolin), a warlord in northern China, engineered by Kwantung Army staff officer Daisaku Komoto, meant the heralding of a massive reform of the nation.

When the Manchurian Incident occurred in September 1931, Tojo was chief of the 1st Section (operations and mobilization) of the Army General Staff. From 1935-1938, he served as military police commander and chief of staff of the Kwantung Army. During this period, the Manchurian Incident escalated into the Sino-Japanese War.

As the Kwantung Army's chief of staff, he was involved in the colonial rule of Manchuria formulated by Naoki Hoshino, chief of general affairs of Manchukuo; Nobusuke Kishi, deputy chief of industry and commerce of Manchukuo; and Yosuke Matsuoka, president of South Manchurian Railway, among others.

After the Sino-Japanese War erupted in July 1937, Tojo advocated strong-arm measures against China and led troops into Chahar Province in Inner Mongolia. On that occasion, he commanded troops in battle for the first time. By extolling his men to charge time and again, his forces gained control of Inner Mongolia. In the Chahar offensive, many Chinese are said to have been executed.

What Japan did in the Manchurian Incident and the Sino-Japanese War fell outside the 1922 Nine-Power Treaty, which obliged Japan and the other parties to the pact to respect the sovereignty and independence of China and observe an open-door policy there. It has been pointed out that members of the Imperial Japanese Army at that time, including Tojo, had only scant understanding of the international treaty signed in Washington.

Tojo was appointed war minister in Prime Minister Konoe's second cabinet in July 1940 and made the first government comparison of military strength between Japan and the United States. The findings indicated Japan would face a formidable struggle should it engage in a prolonged war with the United States. Nevertheless, Tojo said: "America, as a nation, has no core. In contrast, our Empire has a national polity that has been in place for 3,000 years."

The government decided in June 1941 to station troops in southern French Indochina, but there were no indications that Tojo gave serious credence to the risk that the United States would impose an oil embargo on Japan.

Moreover, Tojo ruled out withdrawing from China even as an option in negotiations with the United States. Tokyo and Washington were at loggerheads over the U.S. demand that Japan pull out of China. Tojo thought Japan's claim to Manchukuo and the rule of Korea could collapse like dominoes if Japan conceded to the U.S. demand.

Tojo insisted on going to war with the United States, resulting in the fall of the Konoe Cabinet. Tojo was picked as Konoe's successor.

As the new prime minister, Tojo reviewed the national policy by considering what Koichi Kido, lord keeper of the privy seal, described as Emperor Showa's wishes to avert a war with Britain and the United States.

Akira Muto, chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army General Staff, told Tojo: "In an effort to withdraw [the decision to start a war with the United States], Shinichi Tanaka, chief of operations at the Army General Staff, will have to be dismissed. To make this happen, I also will step down."

However, Tojo refrained from changing the military leadership. But discussing military policies with these same leaders meant changes were unlikely to be made to these policies. He thus failed to halt the slide into war.

Tojo behaved as the leader bent on securing the interests of the Imperial Japanese Army, despite it having no strategy based on international realism. However, after reaching the nation's top post as the ace of that group, Tojo made the final decision to initiate war with the United States.

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Controlling the media

Two core tenets of Tojo's agenda were suppression using the military police and monopolization of information and intelligence by the government.

These moves date back to when Tojo served as commander of the Kwantung Army's military police.

Tojo investigated civilians critical of the Kwantung Army and listed about 4,000 people believed to be socialists, involved in the national reform movement, or involved in activities of the army faction Kodo-ha (Imperial Way Faction).

Ryukichi Tanaka, staff officer of the Kwantung Army in charge of intelligence and stratagem, and others engaged in secret operations for Tojo.

Tojo also kept a close watch on anti-Japanese Chinese and ruthlessly cracked down on them.

Tojo's maneuvers also extended to targeting his political adversaries. In the April 1942 House of Representatives election, Tojo was obsessed with ensuring all seats were filled by candidates recommended by the Yokusan Seiji Taisei Kyogi-kai, a political arm of the Taisei Yokusan-kai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association).

Tojo ordered the military police to put such politicians as Yukio Ozaki, Ichiro Hatoyama and Hitoshi Ashida, who were not recommended by the association, under surveillance. He even had Ozaki arrested during the election campaign.

After the general election, Tojo had his subordinates work to form Yokusan Seiji-kai (Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society), which was joined by almost all lawmakers. Former Prime Minister Nobuyuki Abe, an army veteran, assumed the association presidency.

With these developments, only one ruling party remained in the nation's politics and the Imperial Diet became an arena for rubber-stamping assistance for the war effort.

Troubled by such circumstances, politician Seigo Nakano committed suicide. Ryoji Shikata, chief of the military police in Tokyo and Tojo's former subordinate at the Kwantung Army's military police, reportedly watched Nakano kill himself at his residence.

As the war situation deteriorated, Tojo also sent military police to watch senior statesmen such as Keisuke Okada and Fumimaro Konoe around the clock.

Tojo also showed the mass media no leniency. Soon after the war against the United States started in December 1941, Tojo established a law on controlling speeches, publications, gatherings and associations. The law allowed him, for instance, to stop the publication of a newspaper at his discretion.

Angered by a Mainichi Shimbun article that read, "We cannot fight with bamboo spears," Tojo drafted the article's writer, Takeo Shinmyo, into the military and tried to send him to a battleground where fierce fighting was going on.

Tojo was increasingly called a dictator, although he denied such claims.

"Fuhrer Hitler was a foot soldier, but I'm an army general. Don't mix me up with him," he once said.

At an Imperial Diet session in January 1943, Tojo said: "I'm just one man. Without the Emperor's trust, or if I'm told to resign, I would have nothing left."

"I'm like the moon: I might look that I'm shining, but I'm just reflecting light from the Emperor," he added.

Tojo advocated the idea that people should obey the Emperor's words. In this context, Tojo believed defying him was the same as defying the Emperor.

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Justifying suicidal attacks

Tojo adhered to a kind of revolutionary ideology that held the general populace and civil servants as equal before the Emperor. The public regarded Tojo as a "savior" when Japan won some battles in the early days of the Japan-U.S. war.

However, he sacrificed the lives of soldiers--citizens of the country--like he might a pair of worn-out shoes and crushed the people's right to pursue happiness and freedom of thought, without reflecting on his conduct.

When the Combined Fleet was all but destroyed at the battle of Truk Island in Micronesia in February 1944, Tojo also assumed the post of chief of the Army General Staff. He intended to change the policy course by integrating the authorities to overcome the emergency situation. Only Tojo was able to know the direction of the war situation, with Japan's defeat almost certain, and the country's remaining national power. However, Tojo did not use his absolute authority for responsible politics. Instead, he only exercised it to continue the war.

While Tojo was war minister in January 1941, he announced the "Senjinkun" (Field Service Code) that contained the phrase, "Live without the humiliation of being taken prisoner and die without leaving a blemish on your name." The code, which prohibited soldiers from being taken prisoner, justified deadly charges and promoted "gyokusai" suicidal attacks.

Tojo also lauded kamikaze suicidal attacks in air and naval battles in June 1944.

"The best thing about Japan is that all the people will risk their lives and are not afraid to die...Making infinite use of this advantage, we can destroy the enemy with death squads, by which one airplane destroys one enemy vessel or one special submersible sinks one enemy vessel," he said, according to "Tojo Naikaku Sori Daijin Kimitsu Kiroku" (The Classified Files of Prime Minister Tojo), published by University of Tokyo Press.

Tojo also said: "In Japan, the things flying in the air are not airplanes--they are spirits. Since a sheer number of spirits are flying, there is no way we will be defeated in this war."

His disregard for people's lives reached its zenith after an air raid on Kitakyushu in June 1944. "The raid was like a mosquito landing on one's arm or like mud splashed on a muddy road," he said.

As the impending fall of Saipan drew ever closer and Tojo teetered on the brink of being forced to resign, he made speeches as if he had been possessed by the supernatural.

"This is a sign from heaven to us Japanese. Heaven says: 'You are not serious yet. When will you realize the seriousness of the situation?'" Tojo said, according to the book "Tojo Hideki to Tenno no Jidai" (The era of Hideki Tojo and the Emperor) by historian Masayasu Hosaka. "Now is the time for us to exercise our potential strength. It will be troublesome if you don't understand there is a wall until you hit it with your head so many times."

Even after stepping down from the prime minister's post, Tojo pleaded for the continuation of the war through special suicidal attacks and battles on the Japanese mainland. He even directly made such an appeal to the Emperor.

Until the bitter end, Tojo lacked a sense of consideration for the lives of the people.