WAR RESPONSIBILITY--delving into the past (13) / Emperor Showa stayed within framework for constitutional head of state

The Yomiuri Shimbun

Article 3 of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan, or the Meiji Constitution, stipulates: "The Emperor is sacred and inviolable." This means the Emperor does not bear any responsibility over decisions of national politics.

The state ministers bear such responsibility. Article 55 says: "The respective Ministers of State shall give advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it. It also stipulates: All Laws, Imperial Ordinances, and Imperial Rescripts of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of the state, require the countersignature of a Minister of State."

Legally, therefore, Emperor Showa was not responsible for the affairs of the state.

The government has the same view.

Based on the articles of the Meiji Constitution, Osamu Mimura, then chief of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, said at a meeting of the House of Councillors Cabinet Committee on Feb. 14, 1989, "In terms of domestic laws, Emperor Showa does not have legal responsibility for the war." In terms of his responsibility under international law, Mimura told the same committee, "The problem has already been settled" because the Allied Powers did not indict the Emperor at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, or the Tokyo Trial.

Then, separately from the legal responsibility, was he responsible for the war in a much broader sense?

In fact, Emperor Showa was deeply involved in political decisions in three critical phases. They were:

-- When the cabinet of Giichi Tanaka resigned en masse.

-- When an order to subdue rebels involved in the Feb. 26 Incident was made.

-- When he made "divine decisions" to end the war.

Emperor Showa later recalled the resignation of the Tanaka Cabinet was a "youthful indiscretion." Tanaka did not fulfill his promise to harshly punish Col. Daisaku Komoto, who was the mastermind behind warlord Zhang Zuolin's assassination. Emperor Showa faulted Tanaka about the matter. The Tanaka Cabinet later resigned en masse in July 1929.

It was the first such incident in the history of Japanese constitutional politics. Hard-liners in the army and navy as well as nationalists were infuriated, describing it as a "conspiracy by the Imperial Palace." Kinmochi Saionji, an elder statesman and senior Imperial adviser who regarded a limited monarchy as the ideal system, also remonstrated with the Emperor. Emperor Showa recalled, "After this incident, I decided to approve all things reported by the cabinet, even if I held an opposing opinion," according to "Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku" (Emperor Showa's Monologue; Bunshun Bunko, Bungeishunju-sha, 1995).

If the Emperor freely dismissed ministers, who are held responsible under the Constitution, for their actions or intervened in such matters, the state ministers would be unable to take responsibility.

"For an autocratic country it may be possible, but as the head of a constitutional state, I can't do such a thing," Emperor Showa also said.

The order to subdue rebels involved in the Feb. 26 Incident was issued because Prime Minister Keisuke Okada's whereabouts became unknown and the War Ministry was too soft on the rebels.

The "divine decisions" aimed at the ending the war came after Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki broke with all tradition and took the unheard-of step of asking the Emperor to give his opinion at the Supreme War Council when leaders were split on whether to surrender or continue the war.

A review of the three cases in which the Emperor was deeply involved suggests he was peace-loving in nature and that the cases were rather exceptional.

Nevertheless, the power to appoint a prime minister was accorded to the Emperor. The customary procedure of selecting and recommending a candidate, initially by elder statesmen (advisers to the Emperor) and in later days by lord keeper of the privy seal, was established before and during the war. However, sometimes the Emperor made prior requests.

When the cabinet of Makoto Saito was formed after the May 15 Incident, the Emperor requested that anyone connected to fascist forces should not be chosen.

After the Feb. 26 Incident, he laid out three conditions to successive prime ministers:

-- Respect the Constitution.

-- Following the basic policy of international friendship; no unnecessary conflicts with foreign countries should take place.

-- No sudden changes should be made to the business world.

In addition, the Emperor expressed his opinion, asked questions and tried to persuade state ministers and chief of the Army General Staff.

When the Manchurian Incident occurred, he warned War Minister Jiro Minami, saying, "There will be no smooth solution to the problem if you insist all the blame lies with the opponent."

Three weeks after the Sino-Japanese War erupted, he said to Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe: "It might be a good time now. How about solving the problem through diplomatic negotiations?"

Before the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty with Italy and Germany, he expressed misgivings that the United States would halt oil exports to Japan.

When military and political leaders were debating whether to advance southward or northward, he questioned War Minister Hideki Tojo and Army General Staff Chief Hajime Sugiyama: "You say you'll put troops in northern Manchuria, China and even French Indochina. You will stretch your forces in all directions, but do you really believe you can handle the China Incident?"

At an Imperial Council meeting on Sept. 6, 1941, that decided guidelines for pursuing Imperial national policies, expressing the nation's readiness for war with the United States, he recited a poem written by Emperor Meiji, his grandfather, to express his feelings about peace.

Yomo no umi/mina harakara to/

omou yoni,

nado namikaze no/tachisawaguramu

In as much as all/the seas in all directions/seem siblings of one birth,

Why must the winds and the wavesclash in noisiness?

During the Imperial Council meeting on Dec. 1, which formalized the decision to go to war against the United States, the Emperor remained silent. However, up until that stage, the Emperor had tried to prevent the war within the framework of a constitutional head of state.

Some historians say Emperor Showa should bear responsibility as the supreme commander of the Japanese forces, who was aware of the war situation and guided the war from the Manchurian Incident through to the end of World War II in 1945.

In some cases, however, the Emperor's requests for details on some operations were not complied with even by one general staff member and during the closing days of the war he did not receive correct information.

Article 11 of the Meiji Constitution stipulates: "The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy." Thus state ministers could not interfere in this field. This is the so-called independence of the supreme command. Unlike for state ministers, there were no written regulations on advice to the Emperor and countersignatures.

In actuality, however, orders on military operations by the Emperor were drafted by the chief of the Army General Staff and other top military officers, and countersigned. Thus, the Emperor did not have substantial supreme command authority.

After the war, Emperor Showa reportedly told Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the head of the General Headquarters of the Occupation authorities, that he would take all responsibility for the war. At some point, he told his aides that he would step down from the throne. It seemed that the Emperor tried to take responsibility through abdication.

However, we conclude that de facto responsibility rests with prime ministers, state ministers, army general staff chiefs and navy general staff chiefs.