WAR RESPONSIBILITY--delving into the past (5) / Trial left questions unanswered

The Yomiuri Shimbun

This is the fifth installment of a six-part introductory series in the responsibility of the war era's politicians and military leaders' failure to avoid war.

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, known as the Tokyo Trial, found 27 Japanese leaders guilty and sentenced seven of them, including former Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, to death.

As the Tokyo Trial was administered by the victorious sides, it did not touch on "war crimes" committed by the victors themselves--such as the Soviet Union's detention of Japanese "prisoners of war" in Siberia after the end of World War II and the United States' atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and indiscriminate aereal bombings on Japanese cities.

In its ruling, the tribunal condemned all of Japan's war activities from the 1931 Manchurian Incident to 1945 as unlawful invasions. However, former Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo maintained in the trial that Japan had no choice but to enter the war for self-defense purposes. "[Because of the Hull Note] we felt at the time that Japan was being driven either to war or suicide," he said.

Togo was referring to the "Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement between the United States and Japan" dated Nov. 26, 1941, 12 days before the Pacific War started. As the proposal, sent to Japan by U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, demanded the withdrawal of "all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina," Japan regarded it as an ultimatum from Washington.

Was the war with the United States an invasion or an act of self-defense? The answer to the debate remains still elusive.

The Allied Powers picked only people in the top echelon to be defendants in the trial, while overlooking those who effectively exercised their authority in the war. For example, Gen. Seishiro Itagaki was indicted and subsequently executed for his role in the Manchurian Incident. However, Kanji Ishihara--who was a colonel and director of strategy at the General Staff Office of the Kwantung Army--was regarded as the mastermind behind Japan's offensive in China, but was not indicted.

To decipher the mechanisms of the war, scrutiny should be given to the actions of military brass and front-line commanders.

The postwar Japanese government was unenthusiastic about pursuing war responsibility on its own accord. Kijuro Shidehara, who was prime minister between October 1945 and May 1946, was reluctant to do so because he "didn't want to give the impression that the Japanese were engaged in a blood feud." For its part, the Diet also showed little interest in untangling the issue of war responsibility, although it actively sought the release of Japanese who were in the custody of the Allied Powers as war criminals.

Emperor Showa was not prosecuted because of political considerations on the part of the United States, which oversaw the postwar occupation. Even today, the argument continues over whether the Emperor should effectively be held responsible for Japan's role in the war.

Questions about the Japanese people's "responsibility for aggression" remain unsolved. Likewise, it should be clarified to what extent later generations should bear responsibility for the war.